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ABSTRACT

The Situational Self-statement and Affective State Inventory, a research inventory comprised of five hypothetical situations involving interpersonal conflict, and a series of self-report measures of psychopathology were administered to 224 undergraduates to examine the correlational relationship between specific cognitions and affective states in normal individuals. An additional 212 participants completed only an observer version of the inventory. Specific self-statements were found to correlate highly with corresponding affective states in both the actor and observer inventory conditions. Specific irrational self-statements were also significantly related to noncorresponding dysphoric affects, while a negative relationship was obtained between rational cognitions and dysphoric affects. The magnitude of these relationships was significantly greater for low cross-situationally consistent individuals. Multiple regression analyses indicated that although specific irrational self-statements and affects were only moderately correlated with corresponding self-report measures of psychopathology, the relationship between specific self-statements and affects with respect to the measures was an interactional one. (Author)

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Self-statement and Affective State Relationships: A Correlational Analysis

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Running head: Correlational Relationships

Self-statement and Affective State Relationships: A Correlational Analysis

A major premise of the cognitive models of psychopathology and therapy is that cognitions are related to and directly influence affective states. Ellis (1977) asserts that irrational or maladaptive thoughts produce emotional distress, whereas rational thought result in positive emotional states. Meichenbaum (1977) additionally postulates that the absence of adaptive cognitions results in maladaptive affective responses. Beck (1976) adds further specificity to the cognitive-affective relationship, hypothesizing that the type of cognition determines the specific nature of the emotional response. Despite differences in terminology and the degree of specificity in these formulations, the basic assumption, that emotional states are mediated by self-statements, remains central to these cognitive models.

The majority of studies which have examined the relationship between self-statements and emotional states have investigated the psychophsiological consequences of positive and negative self-verbalizations. In a recent review (Rogers and Craighead, 1977) the results of these studies were critically examined. The authors concluded that due to the inconsistent and unreplicated findings among these studies, the simple generalization that experimentally induced self-verbalizations have definite emotion-arousing effects has not been empirically demonstrated.

Several features of the research strategy utilized in these studies limit their efficacy in the analysis of the relationship between self-statements and affect. First, the studies have primarily emphasized positive, negative, and neutral self-statements, an artificial

categorization which fails to reflect the range and situational specificity of self-statements occurring in everyday life. Further, the self-statements utilized in these studies contained emotionally-laden terms which are essentially descriptors of emotional state. Self-statements of this nature represent a cognitive manipulation confounded with an affective variable label.

Additional studies have examined the effects of self-verbalization of mood state (Coleman, 1975; Hale & Strickland, 1976; Velten, 1968) and the relationship between selected self-statements and affective states (Golfried & Sobocinski, 1975; Hammen & Krantz, 1976; LaPointe & Harrell, 1978; Weintraub, Segal, & Beck, 1974). Considered together, these studies provide some support for the more limited contention that at least some emotional states are related to specific types of self-statements. Further, the results of these investigations have suggested significant individual differences in the nature and degree of the cognitive-affective relationship.

The present investigation was designed to examine systematically the correlational relationship between specific self-statements and affective states in a normal population. The study also examined the utility of cross-situational consistency as an intraindividual mediator of the cognitive-affective relationship. It was hypothesized that specific self-statements would be significantly related to corresponding affective states and to standardized self-report measures of psychopathology. Additionally, it was hypothesized that cross-situational consistency would mediate the cognitive-affective relationship, with low cross-situationally consistent individuals demonstrating significantly greater relationships between specific self-statements and

corresponding affective states relative to high consistency individuals.

Method

Subjects

Participants were 436 male and female undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses at the University of Georgia. The mean age of the participants was 20.1 years. The treatment of participants was in accordance with APA and DHEW ethical standards. Written informed consent was obtained from participants prior to their participation and participants were informed of the purposes of the study following completion of the data collection.

Instruments

The Situational Self-statement and Affective State Inventory is a research inventory which consists of five hypothetical situations. Each situation describes a realistic incident designed to elicit a spectrum of cognitive and affective responses. All situations contain an element of interpersonal conflict, principally criticism or rejection by another person.

The format of the questionnaire and the procedures for its completion are designed to be substantially analogous to a cognitive therapy homework assignment or treatment session in which the client specifies the self-statements and affects experienced in a specific incident.

Following each situation, five sets of self-statement (SSs) and five sets of affective state descriptors (ASDs) are listed. Conceptually, both the SSs and ASDs are categorized within the clinically relevant affective categories of anger, anxiety, suspiciousness,

depression, and rationality. In each situation, one set of SSs and one set of ASDs correspond to each of the affective categories. Thus, all five categories are represented by a separate set of SSs and ASDs within each situation.

The sets of SSs are defined in the following manner:

1. Angry SSs--statements which express indignation or resentment toward others;

2. Anxious SSs--statements which express personal distress and anticipated social disapproval;

3. Suspicious SSs--statements which express distrust of the motives of others;

4. Depressed SSs--statements which express lack of competence and personal failure;

5. Rational SSs--statements which express a realistic, nondistorted evaluation of events.

SSs were carefully constructed to avoid reference to affect in any manner. Each set of SSs contains an evaluative component as well as a statement of behavioral expectancy and/or intention. This construction is intended to represent most accurately the naturally occurring composition of SSs in real life situations. Thus, angry, anxious, suspicious, and depressed SSs are more generally characterized by cognitive errors in evaluation of self and/or the situation as well as maladaptive, noncoping behavioral expectancies/intentions. Rational SSs are characterized by a realistic, nondistorted evaluation of self and/or the incident and a positive, adaptive behavioral expectancy or plan.

While each set of SSs is phrased to be specific to the situation which it follows, all five sets of the ASDs are standardized across situations. Each set of ASDs contains three descriptive terms representing qualitative or quantitative degrees of the affective category.

Participants respond to the SSs and ASDs by rating how characteristic or descriptive each SS and ASD is of them. The rating scale is a five position response scale which ranges from 1 (extremely uncharacteristic or nondescriptive of me to 5 (extremely characteristic or descriptive of me).

Between the listing of SSs and ASDs, two validity questions are presented which ask if the situation seemed realistic and if participants have responded on the questionnaire as they would have if the situation had occurred in real life.

The research inventory utilized in the study is an abbreviated and revised version of an inventory developed and utilized by LaPointe and Harrell (1978). In that study, congruence between the experimenters and participants conceptual classification of SSs into affective categories was determined. Level of agreement between participant and experimenter categorization was greater than 70% for 60 of the 99 sets of SSs included in the initial inventroy. These results indicated that research participants could reliably classify SSs into affective categories selected by the experimenters. All sets of SSs included in the revised inventory demonstrated greater than 70% agreement in the LaPointe and Harrell study.

In completing the research inventory, participants are asked to place themselves into the situations and to respond to the questions as if they had actually participated in the situations. In order to examine further the basis on which participants responded to this format, an observer version of the inventory was developed. In this version, participants are asked to consider the situations as if they were happening to another person, and to answer the questions on the basis of how they believe most other people would have responded to the situations. The main character in each situation and the questions which followed the situations were revised accordingly. The actual content of the situations and the sets of SSs and ASDs were unaltered.

The Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 1967), the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory (Buss & Durkee, 1957), the Social Anxiety and Distress Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969), the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969), Jone's Irrational Beliefs Test (Trexler & Karst, 1973), and the Maudsley Personality Inventory (Eysenck, 1958) were also administered.

Procedure

A test booklet containing an instruction sheet, the research inventory, and the self-report psychopathology questionnaires was administered to 224 participants in groups of 35-50. The research inventory was completed first by the participants, while the order of presentation of the personality scales was counterbalanced. A test booklet containing only an instruction sheet and the observer version of the inventory was administered to an additional 212 participants in group testing sessions.

Results

Validity of the Research Inventory

Of the 436 participants who responded to the two versions of the research inventory and the measures of psychopathology, 22 indicated the situations were not realistic and that they had not responded as they would have if the situations had occurred in real life. An additional 14 participants failed to complete some portion of the test packet. Only the data from the remaining 400 participants were utilized in the subsequent analyses. These findings indicated participants perceived the test situations as relevant samples of problematic interpersonal situations and their test responses as valid measures of their cognitive and affective responses in natural settings.

Consistency Measure

The index of cross-situational consistency (CSC) was constructed by calculating each individual's variance across the 25 SS ratings on the research inventory. Conceptually, the intraindividual variance measure reflected the degree to which the individual was consistent in his/her ratings of SSs over the five situations. A high variance score for a particular individual indicated a relatively low degree of consistency in SS ratings across situations. The distribution of the CSC measure for the sample was described by a mean equal to 1.55, a standard deviation of 0.53, and a minimum and maximum of 0.40 and 3.50. The shape of the distribution was approximately normal.

In the initial correlational analyses, the CSC measure served as the basis for dichotomous group classification of the participants. Participants were rank-ordered according to their variance scores

and assigned to the high or low CSC group on the basis of a median split. In the subsequent multiple regression analyses, the CSC scores were utilized as a continuous participant variable.

Correlational Analyses and Comparisons

For each participant, a single characteristicness rating for each SS and ASD was constructed by averaging the ratings of the corresponding sets of SSs and the ratings of the corresponding sets of ASDs across the five situations of the research inventory. The averaged ratings were used in all subsequent analyses.

Because of the large number of subjects and the number of correlations computed, an alpha level of .005 was specified to insure a meaningful degree of common variance in the statistically significant correlations.

The first analysis was designed to determine the relationship between specific SS and corresponding ASD ratings. The average SS and corresponding ASD ratings were correlated for the low and high CSC groups. The differences between the obtained correlation coefficients for the two groups were tested statistically with a z statistic (see Table 1).

Insert Table 1 here

The actual size of the obtained correlations indicated a meaningful amount of common variance between the measures. Relative to high CSC individuals, low CSC individuals demonstrated significantly greater

positive relationships between angry, suspicious, and rational SS ratings and their corresponding ASD ratings.

The same analyses were applied to the data obtained from the participants who completed only the observer version of the inventory (see Table 1). Only the comparison of the depressed SS-ASD coefficients for the low and high CSC groups was significant.

The second analysis examined the relationship between ratings of rational and irrational SSs and ASDs (see Table 2).

Insert Table 2 here

While irrational SS and ASD ratings were negatively related to both rational SS and ASD ratings in low and high CSC groups, the strength of the relationship was clearly of greater magnitude and significance for the low CSC group.

The third analysis compared the relationship between irrational SS and noncorresponding irrational ASD ratings with the relationship between irrational SS and corresponding irrational ASD ratings (see Table 3).

Insert Table 3 here

This analysis indicated that while irrational SS ratings were related to noncorresponding irrational ASD ratings, the relations between angry, depressed, and suspicious SS ratings and their corresponding ASD ratings were significantly greater in magnitude. This

finding was demonstrated in both the low and high CSC groups.

Multiple Regression Analyses

Utilizing the scores from the standardized psychopathology and personality measures as the dependent variables, a series of multiple regression analyses were undertaken to examine the relationship between specific SS and ASD ratings with respect to the self-report inventories.

The significant degree of correlation among the independent variables necessitated the use of a hierarchical regression model. The specific SS rating was entered first, followed by the corresponding ASD rating. This order was consistent with the causal sequence postulated by cognitive models of psychopathology. The CSC index, representing the hypothesized moderator of the relationship between SSs and ASDs was entered next, followed by the interaction of SS and ASD rating. The final entry of the interaction variable was dictated by the fact that its contribution to the squared multiple correlation was meaningful only after the main effects of the SS and ASD ratings had been partialled.

Within each of the hierarchical multiple regression analyses, the proportion of the variance attributable to each independent variable was determined from the increase in the squared multiple correlation associated with the variable. The significance of the contributions was tested using the appropriate F test. One to three separate regression analyses were conducted for each dependent variable, using specific SS and ASD ratings selected on the basis of their zero-order correlations with the inventories. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 4.

Three general results may be summarized from these analyses. In

Insert Table 4 here

11 of the 13 cases, specific SS ratings accounted for significant proportions of the variance of the inventory scores. Corresponding ASD ratings accounted for significant proportions of the variance of the scores over and above that accounted for by the SS ratings in 10 of the 13 cases. The index of CSC failed to account for significant increments in the variance of the inventory scores. However, the interaction of specific SS and ASD ratings did account for a significant proportion of the variance of the inventory scores, over and above the amount accounted for by the specific SS and ASD ratings, in seven of the 13 cases.

The nature of the interactions was examined by calculating the mean inventory scores for the participants grouped on the basis of high and low SS and ASD ratings. When ASD ratings were high, level of irrational SS ratings had less effect on the inventory scores than when ASD ratings were low. Under the condition of low ASD ratings, increasing characteristicness of irrational self-statements resulted in increases in the inventory scores.

Discussion

The present study was designed to investigate the covariational relationship between specific self-statements and affective states in a nonclinical population. The results strongly supported the principal assumption of cognitive models, as specific rational and irrational self-statements were found to be highly correlated with corresponding affective states.

While specific irrational self-statements were most highly correlated with corresponding irrational emotional states, they were also found to be significantly related to other irrational and distressing affects. This result supports Ellis's (1977) contention that irrational cognitions are related to a variety of dysfunctional and discomforting affects, rather than Beck's (1976) more specific hypothesis that the type of cognition determines the exact nature of the emotional response.

A negative, or inverse relationship was found between rational cognitions and maladaptive affects and between rational and irrational cognitions. This finding is consistent with the cognitive models which postulate that the characteristicness and utilization of rational cognitions in conflictual interpersonal situations is associated with an absence of irrational cognitions and distressing affects in those circumstances.

The strength of the relationship between self-statements and affective states was significantly greater for low cross-situationally

consistent individuals than for high consistency participants. Low consistency individuals also demonstrated a greater tendency to relate irrational self-statements with corresponding rather than noncorresponding affects. Further, low consistency individuals demonstrated a greater negative relationship between rational and irrational cognitions and affects.

Consistent with the conceptualizations of Mischel (1973) regarding the interaction of person and situation variables, the cross-situational consistency findings indicate that within the ambigously structured conditions of the situations, low cross-situationally consistent individuals organized their cognitions and affects along the situationally relevant dimension of rationality (cf. Bem & Allen, 1974), while high consistency participants failed to discriminate the relevance of this dimension in the absence of definitive situational cues. Thus, in ambiguously structured, conflictual interpersonal situations, the rational-irrational dimension appears to be a more meaningful and salient one for low cross-situationally consistent individuals.

Specific irrational self-statements and affective states were only moderately correlated with standardized inventory measures of corresponding dysfunctional affective states, and accounted for small but significant proportions of the variance of the inventory scores. Individuals who rated dysfunctional self-statements and affective states as being uncharacteristic of them obtained significantly lower scores on the corresponding measures of psychopathology than did individuals who rated those cognitions and affects as being highly characteristic. These findings support the position that maladaptive cognitions and affective states are related to the development of psychopathology

and psychological distress.

The relationship between specific self-statements and affective states with respect to the standardized inventory measures was found to be an interactional one. When dysfunctional affects were rated as highly characteristic, the characteristicness of corresponding irrational self-statements had less impact on the inventory scores than when characteristicness ratings of dysfunctional affect were low. Under the condition of low affect, increasing characteristicness of irrational self-statements resulted in higher scores on the measures of psychopathology. This effect is consistent with a large body of experimental literature which has demonstrated that cognitive variables have a limited impact on outcomes when affective levels are high (Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967).

Although replication of this effect utilizing discrete behavioral outcomes is needed, this finding has interesting implications for cognitive therapy procedures and their empirical evaluation. Assuming that the interactional effect is a valid and reliable one, cognitive procedures would be expected to be least effective in acute disturbances or other situations involving high affect. Thus, the prior utilization of procedures specifically designed to reduce levels of perceived affect, such as progressive relaxation, systematic desensitization, and anxiolytic medications would be expected to facilitate the influence of subsequently administered cognitive techniques. An order effect of this nature would not be evident in research paradigms in which multiple procedures were utilized concomitantly or administered separately to independent treatment groups.

The results of this investigation differ from those obtained by

LaPointe and Harrell (1978), who found significant relationships between specific self-statements and corresponding affects in only 13 of 60 cases. However, the divergent findings are apparently based upon methodological differences. In the LaPointe and Harrell study, thought and feeling ratings were correlated separately for each situation, while in the current study, the ratings were averaged across the five situations. Thus, the present investigation focused upon the generalized relationship between self-statements and affects over a variety of conflictual interpersonal situations.

The similarity of the results obtained from actor and observer participants might be construed as supportive of Nisbett and Wilson's (1977) argument that people may base their reports about mental processes on implicit, a priori theories about those processes rather than their actual mental processes. However, Nisbett and Wilson's argument and the examples offered in support of their contention focus on instances in which participants are asked to explain the causes of their behavior in terms of cognitive processes or changes, while in the present study participants were simply asked to rate the characteristicness of a variety of cognitive and affective responses in given situations. Thus, the considerations raised by Nisbett and Wilson may not be applicable to the present investigation (see Kendall & Koreski, 1979; Smith & Miller, 1978).

A more likely interpretation of the results is that participants did interrogate their own cognitions and affects and responded to both inventories on that basis, projecting their own cognitions and emotions onto others in the observer version of the inventory (cf.Ross, 1977). The nature of the phenomena examined in the present investigation lend

themselves to this projective interpretation. It seems unlikely that people possess a representative or normative knowledge of thoughts and feelings of others in specific situations, as these are covert, private behaviors which are not readily discernible through observation and are not typically shared except in intimate relationships. Therefore, it would not be unexpected if people resorted to an examination of their own cognitions and affects when asked to report on the cognitive and emotional responses of others. Additionally, 42 of the 212 participants (19.8%) who completed the observer inventory spontaneously indicated to the experimenter during the debriefing session that they had relied upon their own thoughts and feelings in completing the inventory. In light of these considerations, the results were interpreted under the assumption that the obtained data were representative of the actual cognitions and affects of the participants.

Several methodological features of the current investigation increase the significance of the obtained results. A variety of self-statements and affective states were included, representative of the range and situational specificity of cognitions and affects experienced in everyday life. The self-statements were constructed without the use of affect-laden terminology, avoiding methodological confounding of these variables. Finally, the nature of the response format approximated the self-report of cognitions and affects obtained in clinical evaluation and treatment contexts.

However, additional methodological aspects of the present study emphasize the limitations of the findings. The results of the study are based exclusively upon data obtained through self-report. Similar investigations which employ discrete behavioral criterion measures in the examination of cognitive-affective relationships are needed. Although the current study was specifically designed to provide normative data regarding the relatonship between cognitions and affective states in normal individuals, the cognitive models are based largely upon clinical data obtained from individuals with personality and behavioral disorders. Thus, it is essential that future empirical inquires be directed toward examination of the nature of cognitive-affective relationships in clinical populations.

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Footnote

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Table 1

Correlations Between Self-statement (SS) and Corresponding Affective State Descriptor (ASD) Ratings for High and Low Cross-situational Consistency (CSC) Groups

	Actor Condition				Observer Condition			
SS-ASD	High CSC[a]	Low CSC[b]	z	p	High CSC[c]	Low CSC[d]	z	p
Angry	.436**	.647**	2.09	.025	.575**	.659**	0.96	n.s.
Anxious	.311*	.488**	1.47	n.s.	.308	.425**	0.93	n.s.
Depressed	.511**	.577**	0.65	n.s.	.348**	.566**	1.91	.05
Suspicious	.563**	.797**	3.16	.001	.530**	.660**	1.41	n.s.
Rational	.491**	.773**	3.40	.001	.507**	.380**	1.08	n.s.

[a] n = 107.

[b] n = 93.

[c] n = 104.

[d] n = 96.

*p < .005.

**p < .001.

Table 2

Correlations Between Rational and Irrational Self-statement (SS) and Affective State Descriptor (ASD) Ratings for High and Low Cross-situational Consistency (CSC) Groups

Irrational SS or ASD	High CSC[a]		Low CSC[b]	
	Rational SS	Rational ASD	Rational SS	Rational ASD
Angry SS	-.319*	-.207	-.640**	-.512**
Anxious SS	-.209	-.307*	-.546**	-.458**
Depressed SS	-.299*	-.219	-.537**	-.520**
Suspicious SS	-.368**	-.204	-.709**	-.597**
Angry ASD	-.101	-.033	-.409**	-.335*
Anxious ASD	.125	.167	-.147	-.049
Depressed ASD	-.076	-.103	-.452**	-.381**
Suspicious ASD	-.345**	-.190	-.556**	-.479**

[a] $n = 107$.

[b] $n = 93$.

*$p < .005$.

**$p < .001$.

Table 3

Comparisons of Correlations Between Irrational Self-statement (SS) and Corresponding Affective State Descriptor (ASD) Ratings with Correlations Between Irrational Self-statement and Noncorresponding Affective State Descriptor Ratings for High and Low Cross-situational Consistency (CSC) Groups

Affective State Descriptor Rating	High CSC	Low CSC
Angry Self-statements		
Corresponding		
Angry ASD	.436	.647
Noncorresponding		
Anxious ASD	.262[a]	.176[c]
Depressed ASD	.279[a]	.364[b]
Suspicious ASD	.535	.686
Depressed Self-statements		
Corresponding		
Depressed ASD	.511	.577
Noncorresponding		
Anxious ASD	.275[b]	.313[b]
Angry ASD	.234[b]	.324[a]
Suspicious ASD	.338[a]	.492

Table 3 (continued)

Affective State Descriptor Rating	High CSC	Low CSC
Anxious Self-statements		
Corresponding		
Anxious ASD	.311	.488
Noncorresponding		
Depressed ASD	.493	.576
Angry ASD	.300	.396
Suspicious ASD	.369	.591
Suspicious Self-statements		
Corresponding		
Suspicious ASD	.563	.797
Noncorresponding		
Anxious ASD	.247[b]	.240[c]
Angry ASD	.389[a]	.574[c]
Depressed ASD	.341[a]	.461[c]

Note. Correlations of .290 or greater are significant at $p < .005$. Correlations of .338 or greater are significant at $p < .001$.

Table 3 (continued)

Note. Superscript letters indicate the extent to which the correlation between SS and corresponding ASD is greater than the correlation between SS and noncorresponding ASD. Superscript a indicates significance at $p < .05$, b indicates significance at $p < .005$, and c indicates significance at $p < .0005$.

Table 4

Summary Statistics for Hierarchical Multiple Regressions

Utilizing Specific Variables

Independent Variable	Simple r	Cumulative R	Cumulative R^2	Increase in R^2
Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory				
Angry SS	.302	.302	.091	.091**
Angry ASD	.318	.351	.123	.032**
CSC	-.104	.357	.128	.005
Angry SS*ASD	.318	.383	.147	.019**
Suspicious SS	.247	.247	.061	.061**
Suspicious ASD	.313	.315	.099	.038**
CSC	-.104	.320	.103	.004
Suspicious SS*ASD	.268	.339	.115	.012**
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale				
Anxious SS	.397	.397	.158	.158**
Anxious ASD	.298	.424	.180	.022**
CSC	-.142	.433	.188	.008
Anxious SS*ASD	.401	.437	.191	.003
Depressed SS	.344	.344	.118	.118**
Depressed ASD	.326	.379	.144	.026**
CSC	-.142	.384	.147	.003
Depressed SS*ASD	.332	.427	.182	.035**

Table 4 (continued)

Independent Variable	Simple r	Cumulative R	Cumulative R^2	Increase in R^2
Social Avoidance and Distress Scale				
Anxious SS	.209	.209	.044	.044*
Anxious ASD	.252	.277	.077	.033**
CSC	-.052	.279	.078	.001
Anxious SS*ASD	.259	.280	.078	.000
Depressed SS	.284	.284	.081	.081**
Depressed ASD	.331	.351	.123	.042**
CSC	-.052	.352	.124	.001
Depressed SS*ASD	.308	.382	.146	.022**
Beck Depression Inventory				
Depressed SS	.176	.176	.031	.031*
Depressed ASD	.168	.194	.038	.007
CSC	.061	.222	.049	.011
Depressed SS*ASD	.155	.305	.093	.044**
Irrational Beliefs Test				
Rational SS	-.096	.096	.009	.009
Rational ASD	-.047	.099	.010	.001
CSC	-.136	.154	.024	.014
Rational SS*ASD	-.106	.233	.054	.030

Table 4 (continued)

Independent Variable	Simple r	Cumulative R	Cumulative R^2	Increase in R^2
Anxious SS	.379	.379	.143	.143**
Anxious ASD	.292	.407	.165	.022**
CSC	-.136	.416	.173	.008
Anxious SS*ASD	.388	.418	.174	.001
Depressed SS	.258	.258	.067	.067**
Depressed ASD	.343	.352	.124	.057**
CSC	-.136	.357	.128	.004
Depressed SS*ASD	.290	.395	.156	.028**
Maudsley Personality Inventory				
Rational SS	-.128	.128	.016	.016
Rational ASD	-.058	.133	.018	.002
CSC	-.019	.134	.018	.000
Rational SS*ASD	-.112	.189	.036	.018
Anxious SS	.260	.260	.068	.068**
Anxious ASD	.262	.311	.097	.029**
CSC	-.019	.311	.097	.000
Anxious SS*ASD	.297	.313	.098	.001

Table 4 (continued)

Independent Variable	Simple r	Cumulative R	Cumulative R^2	Increase in R^2
Depressed SS	.252	.252	.063	.063**
Depressed ASD	.347	.354	.125	.062**
CSC	-.019	.358	.128	.003
Depressed SS*ASD	.294	.397	.158	.030**

*$p < .005$.

**$p < .001$.